Developments over the past seventy years in law governing radio use demonstrate the importance of judiciously articulating the Commerce Clause. In the absence of such articulation, an expedient and widely acclaimed solution to a regulatory crisis involving AM radio service in the mid-1920s led to apparent federal authority over all radio use. Statutory law governing jurisdiction in radio regulation changed significantly without significant legislative deliberation. Case law ignored the written text of statutory law and converted weak precedent into doctrine through repetition and dicta. To foster a better federalstate balance in radio regulation, courts should read existing Commerce Clause precedent with renewed appreciation for the eighteenth century meaning of "commerce" as "intercourse." Doing so provides a coherent, relevant, and practical basis for Commerce Clause law in the twenty-first century.
I. Introduction
From 1937 to 1994, the Supreme Court did not find any federal power asserted under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution to be outside the power lawfully granted in that clause. 2 Perhaps the Commerce Clause describes boundaries relevant only to a different era. When the Constitution was written, you could not fly across the country in a matter of hours, you could not talk with a person thousands of miles away, nor could everyone all across the U.S. watch an event occurring in Washington, or on the moon. Our economy seems much more unified now. Federalism itself smells of slavery, succession, and dead bodies. Discussing federalism as a matter of constitutional law seems like an anachronism, a pointless and dangerous diversion, or a betrayal of our national unity. 3 Surely progress means defending the New Deal and upholding the supremacy of our national legislative process in areas classified as economic or social. Why should courts care about federalism? Why should courts care about the Commerce Clause, a most implausible aspect of federalism?
Federal radio regulation shows consequences of careless interpretation of the Commerce Clause. In the 1920s, most persons considered radio to be AM radio broadcasting. Many other uses of radio were known at the time, but they were much less popular. Fruitful development of radio broadcasting was widely thought to require a scheme of federal regulation. With remarkably little attention to statutory construction and judicial process, the courts allowed that consensus to create federal law covering all radio use. This complete federalization of radio law has endured, despite relevant technological, social, political, and economic changes, through to the present. Thus an expedient and widely acclaimed solution to the regulatory crisis of the day led to federal law covering all radio use.
This unprecedented legal development offers the opportunity to better understand the significance of the Commerce Clause. The natural sense of the word "commerce" was much different in the eighteenth century than it is today. Commerce then meant intercourse -ongoing, deeply enmeshing relationships among persons. While much has changed since the eighteenth century, general patterns of human behavior indicate that most persons still seek to realize themselves more fully through relationships with others. Such relationships are not necessarily alternatives to the relationships that define the without causing a chaos of interference, and the fact that radio waves are not confined within the bounds of a single state or nation, make obvious the necessity of unified federal control. 9 If the air is to be used successfully by radio, it must be on the basis of a world utility, regulated by a world public service commission through agreement of the governments. …it is hard to image a station that will not be strong enough to send a message over the boundary of a particular state. 10 This legal scholarship largely ignored "amateur" radio, it lacked insight into the subsequent trajectory of radio technology and radio uses (think, for example, of microwave ovens and garage door openers), and it failed to appreciate adequately then developing European examples of governance. 11 It foreclosed debate about regulatory geography with vague appeals to necessary implications of specialized, extra-legal knowledge.
Contrast this view of the futility of drawing boundaries and the necessity of unified federal control with the FCC's program of area-based auctions of radio rights ("spectrum auctions"), which began in 1993. Under this approach to radio rights, an entity buys from the FCC license to regulate privately radio use within a defined geographic boundary and frequency range. 12 A principle repeatedly proclaimed, but less vigorously followed, has been to give the entity extensive flexibility to control radio use within the geographic area and frequency band. Thus the FCC has made geographically partitioning radio regulation a central component of current radio regulation. The key issue seems to be not technical feasibility but politics: only private regulation, and not public regulation, is allowed sub-nationally, regulatory boundaries are established so as not to correspond to any significant sub-national political boundaries, and all radio rights are subject to the absolute sovereignty of the FCC. 13 Significant changes in statutory law, carried out with little deliberation, have played an important role in eliding the contrast between the consensus of the mid-1920s and the realities of radio use today. Early U.S. radio law formally limited the scope of federal regulation. The first sentence of the Radio Act of 1912 specified:
That a person, company, or corporation within the jurisdiction of the United States shall not use or operate any apparatus for radio communication as a means of commercial intercourse among the several States, or with foreign
9 Federal Control of Radio Broadcasting, 39 YALE L.J. 247, 247 (1929) . The quoted sentences are the first two sentences of the article, which focused on determining which stations should be licensed. 10 The contrast between this sentence, and an obvious, much simpler one, indicates at least a perceived need to describe limits on the scope of the law. 15 Even to a politically and rhetorically sophisticated person of that time, the natural sense of this sentence would have excluded weak radio emissions unrelated to commercial activity and not generally understood as communication, radiograms, or signals. Radio emissions that a home electrical generator might incidentally create are an example of such an exclusion. Many persons probably would have regarded the plain meaning of the sentence to imply additional exclusions as well.
The distinction between interstate radio communications and intrastate radio communications had little practical significance for early radio. Early radio usesmaritime communication, military communication, and "wireless telegraphy" -were closely associated with federal power. Private, non-commercial (amateur) radio users were interested in radio technology. 16 Since the ability to communicate over long 14 16 Private (amateur) radio grew rapidly on an unlicensed basis from 1900-1912. Around Boston alone 250 private stations were estimated to be in operation circa 1909. A significant number of those were asserted to be "equal or superior to those operated by the navy." A leading Navy operator was reported to have said that Navy radio stations were three years behind the leading radio technology and that this technological backwardness made Navy communications more susceptible to interference. (April, 1909) , available at http://www.ipass.net/~whitetho/1909ama.htm. Army, Navy, and other government agencies presented private radio as a nuisance -mere entertainment for "amateurs" who interfered with government organs distances was central to the perceived technological wonder of radio, using radio only for intrastate communication was not an interesting possibility for amateurs. Moreover, influential figures in amateur radio strongly supported the Radio Act of 1912. The opportunity to get a federal license was hailed as a great victory for amateurs. 17 By the mid 1920s, most persons associated radio with AM radio broadcasting. Most AM radio broadcasts in the 1920s covered multi-state areas. Few persons in the 1920s cared about intrastate radio communications. jurisdiction in radio regulation. 35 Note, however, that the statement goes far beyond clarifying the text of the statutory amendment associated with it. Moreover, the Conference met, wrote its report, and the report and the law were passed, all in one day. The law passed on a voice vote that dispensed with reading the Conference Report. While the Conference Report's statement is more closely related to § 302(a)(1), it seems not to provide a correct description of the legislative intent in establishing that provision. In any case, surely legislative history from 1982 is weak evidence for legislative intent in 1968.
In addition to providing influential legislative history, a few small edits buried in the middle of the Communications Amendment Act of 1982 made significant changes to statutory language concerning regulatory geography. First, the purpose of federal radio regulation in the introductory clause of § 301 was expanded. The phrase "to maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of interstate and foreign radio transmission" became "to maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of radio transmission" [emphasis added].
36 Second, the clause describing jurisdictionally distinctive places, § 301(a), was transformed into a clause describing every place. In particular, "from one place in any Territory redundant and heighten the contrast between the introductory clause of § 301 and phrases in § 1 and § 2(a). 39 The Conference Report described these changes as helping to avoid wasteful proceedings when the FCC prosecutes Citizens Band radio operators transmitting in violation of FCC rules. The Conference Report also stated that the amendments make § 301 "consistent with judicial decisions holding that all radio signals are interstate by their very nature." 40 Congress itself had little time to ponder the significance of these amendments. The Communications Amendments Act of 1982 was introduced in the Senate on August 18, 1982 as a substitute for all but the title of a much different House bill. There was unanimous consent to dispense with reading the bill, and the Senate passed it straight away. 41 On August 19, the House requested a conference, the conference met, agreed to minor changes in the Senate bill, reported to both chambers, and both chambers agreed to the conference report. In short, legislation significantly changing the statutory basis for regulatory geography was introduced and passed in two days, with no deliberation in the legislature.
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Eventually federal legislation preempted even the radio issues that most interested state regulators. The federal statutory basis for authority over intrastate radio services was strengthened in 1982, as described above. In 1983, cellular telephony was offered to customers in Chicago. Over the next ten years, some states regulated some cellular phone rates. state regulation of rates and entry for commercial mobile radio may have been a sound regulatory choice. The point is that it was relatively easy to do. State regulators in 1934 did not want to surrender their voice about governance of radio communications. But over time the natural functioning of the national political process seems to have foreclosed much needed deliberation about regulatory geography.
The tension between real needs and the deliberative status of federal radio regulation is evident in recent legislation. On November 22, 2000, a federal law authorized state and local governments to enact laws prohibiting violations of FCC rules governing interference from Citizens Band radio. The authorization was carefully limited to specific FCC regulations pertaining to Citizens Band radio. Services that the FCC licenses under § 301 were explicitly privileged against sub-national regulation. The FCC was authorized to hear appeals of sub-national government's actions. In addition, the law declared:
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to diminish or otherwise affect the jurisdiction of the Commission under this section over devices capable of interfering with radio communication.
44
Overall, the legislation illustrates the practical importance of sub-national regulation. It also shows the national political concern that such regulation not have any legal significance for federal jurisdiction.
Concern over a possible reduction in federal jurisdiction largely shaped the legislative process. On Aug. 2, 1996, a bill was proposed in the Senate to give sub-national governments police powers to resolve interference relating to CB radio. The bill gave FCC concurrent jurisdiction over such issues and explicitly reserved the FCC's exclusive jurisdiction over radio interference falling outside the scope of the bill. 45 That bill was redrafted to retain and emphasize FCC authority over all radio interference. The "non diminish" clause quoted above was added. This new bill was proposed in the Senate on Apr. 17, 1997. 46 A bill introduced in the House on June 24, 1999, was similar to the Senate bill from 1997. The House bill included additional minor edits that emphasized FCC authority. 47 It also included a new sub-section requiring "probable cause" in state or local enforcement action against Citizens Band radio equipment aboard commercial 44 th Congress, 1 st Sess. Sec. 302(f)(2) was extended to require that a state or local government statute or ordinance identify that radio stations licensed by the FCC "pursuant to section 301 ((47 USCA 301)) in any radio service for the operation at issue" are exempt from the state or local law. The FCC licenses CB radios on a class basis, rather than for particular operations. In addition, in § 302(f)(5), the phrase "The enforcement of a regulation by a State or local government" was changed to "The enforcement of a statute or ordinance that prohibits a violation of a regulation by a State or local government". The latter awkward phrase does not seem intended to address state and local governments violating regulations. In light of the legislative history, the change is best interpreted to emphasize that the FCC writes the regulations, and state and local governments are only to pass laws to enforce those FCC regulations. motor vehicles. 48 The bill that finally passed the Senate (Oct. 31, 2000) and the House (Nov. 13, 2000) included further minor edits that again emphasized FCC authority in regulating radio interference. 49 Thus the national political process produced more than four years of deliberation about a possible, small reduction in federal jurisdiction over a particular, relatively unimportant radio use.
U.S. experience highlights significant deliberative failure in the national political process. The weak policy, statutory, and constitutional basis for federal control over all radio use has not been considered in an open, substantive way. Regulatory geography for AM radio broadcasting in the late 1920s and early 1930s probably didn't matter much relative to the political, economic, and social problems of that time. But radio communications is much more important to life in the twenty-first century. Getting better regulation requires seeking truth and sincerely evaluating current beliefs. 50 With respect to regulatory geography, U.S. experience thus far shows little evidence of these crucial aspects of policy deliberation.
III. Case Law on the Federal-State Balance in Radio Regulation
U.S. courts did little to encourage deliberation about the geographic division of power in radio regulation. By 1929, several federal district court decisions had obliterated the distinction between interstate and intrastate radio. Moreover, these decisions ruled that federal regulation of all radio communications is constitutional under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Subsequent decisions of the D.C. Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court followed the decisions of the district courts. Widely cited cases in these higher courts seemed to have relied essentially on dicta in earlier decisions, and the higher courts provided additional dicta on their own initiative. Qualifying language disappeared over time. By the end of World War II, courts seemed reluctant to examine carefully past precedent and the changing nature of radio communications. Moreover, developments in Commerce Clause law suggested that courts could not use that clause to provide judicial review of federal legislation concerning economic matters. Despite the great significance of communications to personal life, public life, and democratic deliberation, regulation of radio communication devices became an "economic" or "technical" matter subject to totalizing federal control.
The first federal court decision considering jurisdiction in radio regulation was Whitehurst v. Grimes (decided Sept. 17, 1927). That case involved an amateur radio operator who brought suit in a district court in Kentucky. The amateur radio operator sought to void a municipal ordinance imposing a license tax on radio operation. In the third and concluding paragraph of its decision, the Court declared:
Radio This decision has been regularly cited as support for the proposition that the Commerce Clause does not limit federal jurisdiction over radio use. The Court noted that emphasis in analyzing radio regulation should be "on the receiving public, whose interest it is the duty of the Government, parens patriae, to protect." Whether bad precedent can be converted into good precedent through time and repetition seems to be the relevant legal question here.
To see existing precedent in action, consider an FCC Order that addressed the constitutionality of an unlicensed low power radio station. important legal principle. But in considering "technical" matters related to "radio" frequencies, courts might apply stare decisis much more carefully and much more narrowly. Areas of human activity that once might have been considered technical radio matters are now central public concerns. Radio regulation, to promote the public interest, needs judicious legal review.
IV. Misunderstanding Commerce in the Real World
In legal deliberations in the 1920s, AM radio broadcasting was abstracted into radio communications, and radio waves were analogized to instruments of commerce such as railroads and the telegraph. 78 Thus a natural aspect of the physical worldelectromagnetic spectrum -was implicitly conceptualized as an instrument. The sense that the physical world is not an instrument but part of creation, and very good, was lost. Dominion over the physical world, in the sense of good stewardship of a household, can easily be mistaken for merely ruling over. Keeping the physical world, in the sense of keeping a garden, can be easily mistaken for keeping a purchase. Both dominion and gardening evoke relationships. AM radio broadcasting, as historically incarnated, can be characterized in terms of relationships among persons. But all activities associated with a particular physical aspect of the world, e.g. activities using (radio) spectrum, cannot be articulated in this way. Because of an unappreciated transformation of its subject, radio regulation developed a totalizing approach radically different from regulation for other aspects of the physical world.
To see how easily this transformation occurred, consider an important, non-judicial opinion. Early in 1926, the Commerce Department apparently was pondering the legality of its implementation of the , a unanimous Supreme Court found that the statutory language "property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce" does not cover an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose. 83 The Court made careful and well-justified formal distinctions between "used in any activity affecting commerce" and "affecting commerce," and between statutory and constitutional questions. Does a realistic appraisal of the meaning of Jones imply limits on federal regulation of land use under the Commerce Clause? Are there constitutional constraints on federal regulation of land use other than the constitutional rules of the national political process? Such questions would be vigorously deliberated if anyone really thought that the answers were not obvious.
Consider also federal regulation of water use. Gibbons v. Ogden ruled that the Commerce Clause comprehended the power to regulate navigation. Navigation, a particular water use feasible in some bodies of water, was considered in Gibbons as an aspect of trade. 84 Most other water uses have been primarily of local concern. Physiographic, climatic, economic, and historical factors create significant differences in water use across the U.S. 85 States and persons hold title to most water on the land and tidal areas of the U.S. 86 Water use law has primarily developed within states and localities. As a Supreme Court decision that reviewed the federal-state balance in water law noted:
The
history of the relationship between the Federal Government and the States in the reclamation of the arid lands of the Western States is both long and involved, but through it runs the consistent thread of purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Congress. 87
Whether Congress could regulate all water use under the Commerce Clause is a question that has been unnecessary to discuss. Even to contemplate it seems impolite.
With respect to specific activities, a federal statute might rationally be interpreted to have regulated water use to the fullest extent possible under the Commerce Clause. Section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act regulates discharging dredged or fill material into "navigable waters." "Navigable waters" are defined under the Act as "the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." 88 In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Corps of Engineers, the petitioner sought to use an abandoned sand and gravel mining site to dispose baled, non-hazardous solid waste. The site included "a scattering of permanent and seasonal ponds of varying size (from under onetenth of an acre to several acres) and depth (from several inches to several feet)." 89 The Supreme Court found that Congress had not made a clear statement indicating that the Act covers such sites. 90 The Court noted "the States' traditional and primary power over land and water use," cited precedent indicating a preference for avoiding constitutional questions, and read the Act as not applying to the site.
A vigorous dissent argued that the Act clearly addresses its regulations to all "waters over which federal authority may properly be asserted." 91 The dissent analyzed this federal authority under the Commerce Clause and concluded that Congress has the power to prohibit "filling any part of the 31 acres of ponds" on the site. 92 Even dissenting Supreme Court justices, by virtue of their position in the U.S. judiciary, deserve to have their formal statements categorized as rational. 93 While the correct legal interpretation may still be debated among scholars, the Clean Water Act surely can be rationally interpreted to regulate a particular water use to the fullest extent possible under the Commerce Clause.
The point is that the Clean Water Act identifies a particular water use. As the dissent pointed out:
The More generally, the dissent noted that the Clean Water Act proclaimed the goal of ending water pollution by 1985. 95 Legislative history of the Act includes a statement that the "main purpose" of the Act is "to establish a comprehensive long-range policy for the elimination of water pollution."
96 Water pollution is a much narrower class of activities than water use. Moreover, many types of water pollution effect relationships of harm substantially between persons within a state and persons outside the state. 97 Such relationships clearly come under the meaning of interstate commerce.
The development of aviation regulation also shows the importance of understanding the Commerce Clause in relation to specific activities. Law of the air in the 1920s meant law concerning aviation and law concerning radio. 98 With the development of aviation and radio broadcasting, the physical characteristics of air gained new significance. Just as persons struggled to communicate the meaning of radio spectrum ("the ether"), a judge in 1934 similarly struggled to define airspace:
What is the sky? Who can tell where it begins or define its meaning in terms of the law? When can it be said that a plane is above the sky or below it? 99
Many subsequent cases struggled with such issues, and law in this area remains unclear to this day. 100 Federal law of the air has, however, remained focused on aviation. Despite the significance of tall objects and airports to aviation, federal air regulations carefully assert only an advisory role in regulating real estate development. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rules require that it be given notification of plans for a construction extending more than 200 feet above ground level. 105 The FAA analyzes the implications of the construction for air navigation and categorizes the construction as a hazard or not a hazard. The FAA does not assert authority to prohibit constructions that it deems hazardous to air navigation. 106 The FAA also requires notification for construction of an airport. 107 Upon such notification, the FAA does an aeronautical study of the proposal, and then states objections, if any, and in some cases conditions for ameliorating objections. The FAA does not claim authority to prohibit construction in any case. 108 Thus FAA regulations show considerable respect for state and local governance of activities significantly affecting the use of the airways, i.e. the use of air for aviation.
A federal law regulating all uses of the air would raise serious constitutional issues under the Commerce Clause. The Air Commerce Act of 1926, like the Radio Act of 1927, distinguished between interstate and intrastate activities. 109 In the 1930s, states passed statutes regulating intrastate aviation. 110 Over time, however, federal law came to cover both interstate and intrastate aviation. This development of federal law seems to have sound legal and practical bases. But despite many public concerns relating to aviation, airspace law was not totally federalized. A complex and vitally important law governing air rights relating to real estate developed at the state and local level. 111 State and local law regarding airport zoning and associated nuisances also developed. 112 These developments indicate awareness that the Commerce Clause places limits on federal regulation of air use.
Electromagnetic spectrum is similar to land, water, and air. Electromagnetic spectrum, like land, water, and air, is a general aspect of the physical world. Electromagnetic spectrum, like land, water, and air, is not itself an instrumentality of commerce. New technological developments are rapidly expanding the range and variety of human activities that use radio. That one federal law would assert authority under the Commerce Clause to govern interstate highways and backyard sandboxes (land use), or water pollution and swimming (water use), or aviation and speech (air use), seems so remote and gratuitously provocative as to be not worth deliberating. But current federal law that governs "disturbing" radio spectrum is that type of law.
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V. Re-Articulating Commerce
To identify and maintain boundaries for radio regulation under the Commerce Clause, one must recover the natural sense of the word "commerce" in eighteenth century thought. "Commerce" meant intercourse. 114 The word "commerce" has been used in English only since the sixteenth century, when it came into use to supplement "merchandise," meaning the buying, selling or bartering of moveable goods, or the moveable goods themselves. 115 With the rapid growth of the English economy in the second half of the sixteenth century and the development of a Dutch empire in world trade, the activity of merchandizing became a systematic network of ongoing relationships. 116 Ongoing, deeply enmeshing relationships is what "commerce" added to the terms "merchandise," "traffic," and "trade."
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Key works in the English language illustrate this meaning. Consider Christian scripture. In the King James Version of the Bible, a translation finished in England in 1611, the words "merchandise," "trade," and "traffick" occur repeatedly, but "commerce" never occurs.
118 Words used in a sense most closely approaching the eighteenth century meaning of commerce are in Matthew 22:5 ("But they made light of it, and went their ways, one to his farm, another to his merchandise") and in John 2:16 ("make not my Father's house a house of merchandise") In the Vulgate, St. Jerome's Latin translation of Christian scripture in 400 CE, these phrases are rendered with forms of "negotiation," meaning wholesale or banking business, or more generally, business or traffic.
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Twentieth-century translations use "business" for "merchandise" in Matthew 22:5, and "into a market," "place of business," or "house of trade" for "house of merchandise" in John 2:16. 120 These meanings were too narrow to invoke the use of the word "commerce" in early seventeenth century English.
Shakespeare shows that the natural sense of commerce then covered the full sense of human relationships. The word "commerce" occurs four times in Shakespeare's oeuvre. 121 Malvolio, a courtier deluded that has become a great political and romantic favorite of the Countess Olivia, is described by Olivia's maid at the end of a playful dialogue as being engaged "in some commerce with my lady."
122 That is an insinuation of intercourse in many human dimensions. Regarding Archilles' intimate relationship with a prominent woman in the enemy city of Troy, Ulysses says to him: "All the commerce that you have had with Troy / As perfectly is ours as yours, my lord."
123 The significance to the state of this relationship -this commerce -means that it could not be kept hidden. To Agamemnon, the leader of the Greek camp, Ulysses urges the importance of respecting order in relationships, and he contrasts "peaceful commerce from dividable shores" with bounded waters flooding the globe, sons striking fathers, and power, will, and appetite perverting justice. 124 Finally, in a scene underscoring disordered relationships, Ophelia, returning love letters to a Hamlet deeply troubled by the events in his family and in the royal court, asks Hamlet: "Could beauty, my lord, have better commerce than with honesty?" 125 Hamlet responds by speculating on the transforming power of relationships between virtues and of relationships between persons. Thus commerce means intercourse so intimate and comprehensive as to be transformative.
online search of the Vulgate, available at http://www.lib.uchicago.edu/efts/ARTFL/public/bibles/vulgate.search.html 119 See Vulgate text, id. For an online Latin dictionary, see the Perseus Digital Library, available at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/resolveform?lang=Latin. The early Greek texts use, in Matthew 22:5 and John 2:16 respectively, "emporia" and "emporion". These terms mean trade or a place of trade. See interlinear Greek, Strong's Concordance, and Vine's Expository Dictionary linked to verses online at Blue Letter Bible, http://www.blueletterbible.org/index.html. A translation in Rheims in 1582 used "merchandise" and "traffick" in the same respective passages. See Douay-Rheims translation at The Unbound Bible, available at http://unbound.biola.edu/. 120 For eighteenth century intellectuals and public figures, the natural and obvious meaning of commerce comprised a broad sense of relationship. The 1776 Declaration of Independence declared the "United Colonies" to have "…full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do." Consider the four distinguished acts and things: "War," "Peace," "Alliances," and "Commerce." The selection and order of these terms indicates that commerce, balanced against "alliances," is a serious, informal, general, peaceful relationship not merely limited to trade.
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Montesquieu discussed doux commerce -sweetness and gentleness that commerce engendered in relations among persons. This state of relations he set in contrast to hostility and violence.
127 A Scottish historian in 1769 declared: Commerce tends to wear off those prejudices which maintain distinction and animosity between nations. It softens and polishes the manners of men.
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Concern about commerce meant concern about relationships among persons. Thus James Madison argued that the purpose of the Commerce Clause is to avoid practices that would "nourish unceasing animosities" and that might "terminate in serious interruptions of public tranquillity." The The opinion clearly identifies "commerce" as "intercourse," meaning more than "traffic" or "trade." Yet the opinion also uses the phrases "no sort of trade," "commercial intercourse," and "trading intercourse." These phrases may have contributed to misunderstanding the eighteenth century meaning of commerce as being only a particular dimension of intercourse, and thus less than intercourse. 134 The concurring opinion shows meaning moving in that direction:
Commerce One might consider the transmission of intelligence to be intrinsically related to human intercourse. But Pensacola's reference point was not the primary ruling in Gibbons but the concurrence. Pensacola presented intelligence as a commodity -something "transmitted" like a commercial good. The wonder of the telegraph was that it separated communication from physical relation and movement of objects:
But the telegraph transports nothing visible and tangible; it carries only ideas, wishes, orders, and intelligence. 138
In these decisions and others, the Court found telegraphic communication across state lines to be interstate commerce. Rather than understanding communication as intersubjectivity extended in space, courts, following Pensacola and reasoning consistent with the intellectual and practical circumstances of their times, presented communications as the transmission of intelligence analogized to a commodity.
Yet by the late nineteenth century, the telegraph had substantial and well-recognized affects on relationships spanning the nation. Telegraph lines expanded with the railroads, enabling considerable capital savings and thus enabling more persons to be brought more quickly within the scope of this national transportation network. 139 Logistical control through telegraphic communication prompted a new national division of labor in the slaughtering and meat packing industries, a national trade in fresh fruits and vegetables, and the growth of mail order houses and mass merchandising. 140 The telegraph also transformed commodities and securities trading. By 1874, Western Union Telegraph transmitted near-real-time transaction data from the New York Stock Exchange to 116 other cities. 141 By that time Western Union was the first national monopoly, pointing toward a new, important national political issue. Working with the U.S. Navy, Western Union also transmitted nationally time synchronization pulses that standardized time across the nation. 142 Moreover, arising directly from the opportunities that the telegraph presented and closely tied to Western Union, the Associated Press had become "one of the most powerful centripetal forces shaping American society."
143 By the late 1880s, Associated Press wire dispatches made up 80-100% of news copy in mid-western small town dailies.
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These realities should be recognized when reading the Pensacola decision of 1877. That decision merely briefly noted that the telegraph had "changed the habits of business" and had fostered communications among government officials spread across the country and the world. 145 Certainly the telegraph had done much, much more than that. The telegraph greatly transformed relationships among persons across the nation. Yet the heart of the Pensacola decision was to judge intelligence to be a commodity. Judging the scope of commerce came to be about identifying commodities and estimating effects on commodity streams. 146 The loss of the eighteenth century understanding of commerce in 146 To get a sense for the extent to which analysis of commerce got unmoored from the eighteenth century understanding of commerce, consider this analysis in a 1928 law review article examining the law of radio communication:
Pensacola now seems natural and unremarkable. Commerce as an economic reality is now firmly entrenched in a grand, deterministic narrative of the rise of a single national market.
147 A better reading of Pensacola looks backwards and finds a different story. In the silences of Pensacola -the obvious, unnoted reality that railroads and telegraphs dramatically changed human relations across the country -one can recognize the resources for much more vigorous and fruitful deliberations about the Commerce Clause.
VI. Spurring Fruitful Deliberation
Considering commerce in its eighteenth century meaning can help to revitalize deliberations about the Commerce Clause. One might well consider many past Commerce Clause cases to be correctly decided, or at least to be prudently preserved. But decisions are written to be discussed. Taugher, supra at 314. The telegraph's use of electromagnetic energy to transmit messages has little to do with the intercourse related to the telegraph. Locomotives' use of iron railroad tracks likewise has little to do with the intercourse associated with railroads. 147 A more critical approach to this narrative is needed. What does it mean to say that the U.S. (or the European Union) is a "single market"? The contextual significance of such references are usually promotion of a particular set of contemporary economic policies. In attempting to give this use of "market" additional historical significance, Lessig, Translating, supra at 138 suggests:
There is no simply way to describe this difference in the extent of integration, and no handy way to quantify it. But I don't believe that we need data to make the point that I want to make here: That integration in the sense I suggest has increased; that more operates in a national rather than local market; and that this change in the extent of the market properly has consequences for the scope of federal and state power. Consider one long-run economic trend that Lessig neglects: the growth of (monetized) services in the economy. Transactions for services tend to be more individualized, more localized, and involve more relationship-specific investments than transactions for goods. That the "market" for health care now is much more national than the "market" for corn was in the mid-nineteenth century is not at all clear. The same seems to be the case for the economy as a whole. On trends in shared symbolic experience and cultural homogeneity, see Douglas A. Galbi . 149 The first three found that the Commerce Clause provides authority to enjoin racial discrimination in certain motels, restaurants, and snack bars in the 1960s. The latter found that the Commerce Clause does not provide authority to enact civil remedies against gender-motivated violence in the 1990s. These decisions imply a judgment directly related to the eighteenth century notion of commerce. Through them the Court judged that racial discrimination in the 1960s was a national problem in commerce -intercourse -to an extent that gender-motivated violence in the 1990s was not.
That judgment might seem controversial or questionable, but it has a rational basis. In an ideal speech situation, which characterizes a type of rationality, most persons might agree with the Court's judgment. Alternatively, based on lived experience, actual discussions with real persons, and moral intuition, most persons might agree with the Court's judgment. A mass of statistics and citations might also, on a purely formal level, be impressive enough to convince some. Others might seek a clear, disciplined, and coherent analysis of statistics, preferably calculated using data from sources collecting data for broad purposes, in a methodical way, and with full documentation of definitions and measurement techniques. Today there is no general agreement about what a rational basis for a view formally entails. If there ever were such agreement, it certainly broke down more than a century ago. A dominant thrust of philosophical and literary thought over the past decades has been to show the tenuous and historically contingent character of the basis or foundation for reasoning and knowledge. 150 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court is the head of a judicial process that deserves considerable respect. Its decisions, in a serious sense, define an important type of rationality. Therefore, that racial discrimination in the 1960s was a national problem in commerce to an extent that gendermotivated violence in the 1990s was not is a statement with a rational basis.
The Supreme Court's rationality has significance not just because it has legal force, but also because the Court provides written decisions that can stimulate fruitful discussions.
Such discussions do not naturally emerge via the workings of some invisible hand or tongue. Good discussion, like every other aspect of human existence, requires resources and confronts constraints. To see how the eighteenth century meaning of commerce can support more disciplined reading of statutes, prompt recognition of previously unrecognized but relevant facts, eliminate some utterability constraints, and stimulate imaginative discussion, consider in more detail Morrison. 151 Morrison concerns gender and the Violence Against Women Act. 152 What does "gender" mean in the Violence Against Women Act? Gender there, as in much of the gender literature, seems to mean concern only about women. However, interpreting "gender" to mean "women" probably would be an inappropriately cramped reading of the Violence Against Women Act. "Gender" might better be read in the Act as a simple substitute for "sex" (among those who consider "sex" to be impolite, undesirable, or unfashionable), or as a word emphasizing the social and political construction of sexual categories, particular from a post-modern perspective that does not take the intrinsic differences between males and females to be significant. 153 A hypothetical (reasonable) Member of Congress in the year 1994 probably would have had the courage to use "sex" in a statute and probably would not have felt compelled by decorum to choose the more ambiguous substitute "gender." Moreover, a (hypothetical) reasonable Member of Congress in the year 1994 or in the year 2000 probably would have wanted the statute to apply to a man, hostile to the idea of women voting, who assaulted, for that reason, a man voting dressed as a woman. Thus, in judicial interpretation of the Violence Against Women Act, gender should be understood to refer to the social and political construction of sexual categories. Now consider the Violence Against Women Act relative to the Commerce Clause. The Act addresses "a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender." 154 Criminal violence, without further qualification, has long been recognized as a matter of intrastate commerce. One might analyze whether that is still appropriate under current circumstances by considering whether the relationships associated with criminal violence have a substantial interstate component. 155 But criminal violence does not describe well the relationship that the Act governs. The relationship that the Act governs is better described as gender hostility to such an extent that it is expressed in criminal violence.
Attention to appropriately characterizing the relationships of concern matters for analysis. A lower court made specific findings that the alleged crime in Morrison expressed gender animus. But such evidence does not go to the constitutionality of the Act under the Commerce Clause. Cited statistics from the "mountain of data" put forward to support Commerce Clause authority consisted only of evidence that criminal violence significantly affects women. 156 Such violence is repugnant and an insult to human dignity. Thus data describing it are an affective showing. These data do not, however, provide useful material for discussing Commerce Clause authority.
Other aspects of the formal use of data in Morrison have similar weaknesses. The principal dissent cites statistics concerning the effects of violence against women on "the supply and demand for goods in interstate commerce," as well as on "reductions in the [size of] the work force." 157 These data seem to reflect "silly questions rather than meaningful ones" and "tedious and somewhat arcane attempts to show how various social problems affect the economy." 158 The statistical material in Morrison does not enrich deliberation about the Court's judgment that racial discrimination in the 1960s was a national problem in commerce to a greater extent than gender-motivated violence in the 1990s.
With a better understanding of commerce, the Court could have easily found statistics and pushed forward analysis that would have stimulated meaningful deliberation. Consider, for example, that in 1999, 12,785 males and 4,104 females died from assault (homicide). 159 Gender unquestionably has something to do with the fact that more than three times as many males were killed. One would explore whether gender animus, in particular, notions of male disposability and social norms suggesting that killing a male is less horrible than killing a female, are part of the explanation for this disparity. With respect for the Commerce Clause, one would also consider whether these norms reflect a systematic national pattern of human relationships that is not encompassed by relationships in the states taken separately. 160 Such facts and such analysis do not appear to have been seriously considered in the intellectually and rhetorically mechanistic deliberations about the Violence Against Women Act, or in the Court's analysis of its constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. Doing justice in a case is not a matter of displaying a mass of statistics, or even analyzing a couple. But facts can be useful in identifying truth. The eighteenth century meaning of commerce can help to inform the selection and analysis of relevant facts. With more emphasis on intercourse, the situation may be more appealing. While everyone may in some sense be related to everyone else, one intuitively recognizes that the relationship between spouses is of different quality than the relationship between foreigners. 163 No arcane and tedious calculations of economic effects are necessary. More generally, compared to such calculations, evidence and judgments about the boundaries of ongoing, systematic relationships are likely to produce a more coherent, stable, understandable, and satisfying body of law. 164 Current case law tends to interpret the "substantially affects" test to describe an absolute measure of a single, all-encompassing quantity -dollars. In Lopez, the Supreme Court "identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power." 165 The final broad category was described as follows: "Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities that have a substantial relation to interstate commerce i.e. those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce..." 166 Such language does not prescribe a particular method of analysis. The requirement for "substantial relation" is entirely consistent with an eighteenth-century understanding of "commerce." Nonetheless, toting up the "effects" of an activity in dollar terms predominates in asserting the constitutionality of a federal statute under the Commerce Clause. This may be related to the intellectual aura of cost-benefit analysis. But even under this spell, law in this area struggles to establish legal discipline. 167 Extent of relationship provides a better metric for disciplined analysis of relevant facts. Common discourse, as well as scholarship outside the discipline of economics, often identifies as values sex and power, in addition to money. But all three of these values appear to be, at least in academic discourse, reducible to any one. Real relationships, in contrast, are case-specific and not reducible. 168 The definition of the relationships of concern itself often provides a natural, direct measure for judging whether there is a substantial interstate component. Thus water pollution, understood in terms of ecological relationships, has a substantial interstate component. The allocation of water among persons living along a stream within a state does not. Growing wheat for home consumption in the U.S. in the year 2002 might concern only relationships within households, while in a time and place where agriculture was key to national economic stability, the relevant set of relationships might be much different. 169 A relational understanding of commerce has additional advantages with respect to jurisdictional elements. Suppose Congress passes a law making it a federal crime to kill a child where the child wears any article of clothing home-sewn or otherwise affecting interstate commerce. Would such a law mass constitutional mustard? The significance of murdering clothed children to intercourse would seem to be about how threats to children, and parental fears of such threats, affect children's opportunities to participate in social interaction. Thus the clothes that a child wears would not matter in judging whether such a law comes under the scope of the Commerce Clause. In contrast, a jurisdictional element such as participation in activities sponsored by national organizations, and a finding that threats to children participating in such activities are in fact greater, would be relevant to Commerce Clause analysis. Analysis would thus recognize real circumstances and make meaningful distinctions.
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VII. Doing Justice in Communications
If, in 1934, the Gregg case had been judged in terms of the relational understanding of commerce natural in the eighteenth century, the ruling may well have been different. "The Voice of Labor" described itself as follows:
That U.S. communications regulation views localism and universal service as key public policy objectives. The ruling in Gregg fostered neither of these objectives. From a legal perspective, in considering whether federal suppression of "The Voice of Labor" is constitutional under the Commerce Clause, the ruling did not consider whether stations like "The Voice of Labor" were actually engaged in interstate commerce. The facts of the case indicate that "The Voice of Labor" employees, listeners, and programmers did not have a substantial interstate relation relevant to the case. On that basis and with appreciation for the natural sense of commerce as understood at the time the Constitution was written, the Court might have let "The Voice of Labor" continue broadcasting to the community about Houston, Texas.
One can imagine today equally compelling cases that would not be brought because the prospects for justice now appear so dim. Suppose an inner city school in Atlanta wants to use a device utilizing short-range radio emissions to screen students for guns. The device has been successful deployed in another country. While it uses radio spectrum categorically forbidden for such devices in the U.S., there is no evidence that it causes harmful interference to any other radio use. Suppose the Georgia Public Service Commission, unwilling to accept the FCC's refusal to license the device, authorized the school to use the device. Why should courts be unable to deliberate about an FCC enforcement action against this federally unauthorized radio use?
Here's another possibility. Suppose that a poor, retired cowboy in Idaho lives twentyfive miles, by deeply rutted dirt roads, from the nearest oncological specialist. He needs a weekly visual examination to confirm the shrinkage of a tumor. The most costeffective wireless video conferencing system under the geographic and meteorological conditions in Idaho uses radio spectrum allocated in the U.S. to broadcast television services. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare and the Idaho Public Utilities Commission, in light of pressing rural healthcare needs, jointly declare that such systems can be used in Idaho so long as they do not cause harmful and irremediable interference to any other radio users. Why should courts be unable to deliberate about an FCC enforcement action against this federally unauthorized radio use?
For a more mundane but very contentious concern, consider mobile phone suppression technology. Maintaining a certain aural atmosphere is an important concern in opera theatres, movie houses, courtrooms, and other places. In such places, ringing mobile phones ringing are a disturbing and interfering sound. Radio technology now available allows the organization that operates a space to suppress electronically mobile phone communications. Mobile phone suppression technology is illegal in most developed countries, but permitted in Israel and Japan. As of mid-2001, Hong Kong and Canada were considering legalizing mobile phone suppression. 174 There is some evidence of low-level debate about this issue in the U.S. 175 One might imagine state or local politics engaging with the issue and experimenting with different policies. Why should the only forum for considering this issue in the U.S. be the Federal Communications Commission? 176 The significance to radio communications of inarticulate Commerce Clause jurisprudence is growing. Wireless technology is developing rapidly, with costs plummeting and the range of applications expanding dramatically. Such technology is being adopted quickly in many countries around the world. Moreover, many countries are likely to permit short-to-medium-range radio services in spectrum bands where such services are not permitted in the U.S. Geographic, demographic, and economic conditions vary significantly across U.S. states. Federal radio regulation will not be able to respond completely, with no contested decisions, to the wide range of radio communications needs and opportunities that will be presented to U.S. state governments. Yet a simplistic, widely held, and scarcely deliberated view of the Commerce Clause's meaning for U.S. radio regulation might prevent courts from ever seriously considering desperate pleas for justice.
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VIII. Conclusion
Federal jurisdiction over all radio use merits more judicial scrutiny. Authority in this area consists essentially of three federal district court decisions from the 1920s, dicta, and the unquestioned belief that comprehensive and uniform federal control over all radio use exists and is necessary. 178 The absence of judicial scrutiny has allowed significant statutory changes to proceed as if written law never mattered. By failing to highlight courts' relevant experience in addressing a wide range of interference issues, case law has fostered the view that interference in radio use raises wholly distinctive questions that cannot be addressed in the courtroom. Courts have thus allowed law governing radio use to take a much different form than law governing land use, water use, and air use. This exceptional form of radio law is now widely considered to be hindering the development of communications capabilities.
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Existing Commerce Clause precedent, invigorated with renewed appreciation for the eighteenth century meaning of "commerce" as "intercourse," could help push radio law back into the main stream of U.S. law. The line of cases from Gibbons to Shreveport to Lopez is consistent with the Commerce Clause providing constitutional protection against federal suppression of radio use that entails no substantial interstate relation. Rather than pursuing some generic reduction of all relations to dollars, characterizing the human relationships at issue in a case, and their actual scope, should be at the center of statutory analysis and fact-finding. Such an approach would provide coherence to Commerce Clause precedent and a sound basis for the important judicial role of judging whether federal law transgresses the Commerce Clause.
